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Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby
Formation
Summary
We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players
simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage,
players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to
influence the government’s choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using
perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET),
we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid
solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not
necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby
group is formed by the players with highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it a consecutive
group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium
level of public goods provision shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.
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1

Introduction

The menu auction theory developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) is widely used in
political economy models with lobbying, especially in the field of international trade (e.g.,
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Lobbying for protection can be considered as a public good
provision for the industry in question. Since the provision of the public good aﬀects all
players positively, they all have free-riding incentives. Thus, it is important to explicitly
model the stage of lobby formation to see if lobbying is eﬀectively conducted. We construct
a two-stage game of public good provision, where in the first stage players decide if they
join a contribution group (a lobby). In the second stage, the participants of the contribution
group oﬀer their contribution schedules (menus) to the government, and the government
decides how much it provides the public good given the oﬀered contribution schedules and
the costs of public goods provision. In this context, we address following questions. How
serious is the free-riding problem? What types of players participate in the lobby? How
eﬃcient are equilibrium outcomes?
The set of Nash equilibria of our second stage game (a common agency game or menu
auction game) studied by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) is very large and contains many
unreasonable equilibria. In order to refine it, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) define the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), a communication-based equilibrium concept with
credible enforcement, and provide a nice characterization of CPNE. In fact, since public
goods provision involves a coordination problem among players, it clearly makes sense to
employ communication-based refinement of Nash equilibria in our game. To analyze our
two stage game, therefore, we employ perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE),
which is a natural extension of CPNE to dynamic games (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston,
1987). This solution concept has some merits: (i) it allows players to propose a (coalitional)
deviation plan in which they coordinate in their strategies through the communication, and
(ii) it assures that no free-riding incentive remains in equilibrium by requiring credibility of
proposed deviation plans.1 The second merit may require some clarifications. Suppose that
1

CPNE and PCPNE are strategy profiles that are immune to (recursively defined) credible group devia-
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a subset of players participate in public goods contributions. In public goods economies, it
is always possible to improve eﬃciency in the Pareto manner by inviting nonparticipants to
the contribution group. Once such invitations are made, however, some of participants may
have an incentive to leave the contribution group since public goods provision level may still
be high enough after they leave the group. By adopting PCPNE as the equilibrium concept,
we can eliminate all free-riding incentives in equilibrium since PCPNE requires all possible
deviations to be credible.
We characterize the PCPNEs of our game by a novel hybrid solution concept, utilizing
the core in cooperative game theory. It is not a surprise that there are connections between
menu auction outcomes and the core. Laussel and Le Breton (2001) show that in the class
of comonotonic games,2 the generated cooperative games are convex, and the equivalence
between CPNE and the core results. We add a lobby formation stage to Laussel and Le
Breton (2001), and characterize PCPNE in order to analyze a participation problem. A freeriding-proof core allocation for coalition S (FRP-Core allocation for S ) is a core allocation
achieved by contribution group S in which no member i of S has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally expecting the public good provision to become at the eﬃcient level for group
S\{i}. A free-riding-proof core for S (FRP-Core for S ) is the collection of all FRP-Core
allocations for S. That is, the FRP-Core for S is the collection of all internally stable
allocations (no lobby member free-rides given a surplus allocation scheme). Note that it is
possible to have an empty FRP-Core for S if S is a large coalition. The free-riding-proof
core (FRP-Core) is the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier of the union of FRP-Cores for all S ⊆ N.
That is, the FRP-Core is a collection of internally stable allocations that are not Paretodominated by any other internally stable allocations. We prove that PCPNE and FRP-Core
are equivalent (Theorem 1), utilizing the properties of the core in convex games (Shapley,
1971).
This equivalence theorem is useful in analyzing the PCPNE of our game. We examine
tions with their strategies coordinated. A credible deviation is a deviation that is immune to further nested
credible deviations.
2
Preferences are comonotonic if for all pair of players i and j, and all pair of actions a and a0 , if i prefers
a to a0 , then j also prefers a to a0 .

3
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the set of FRP-Core allocations of a simple example in which players diﬀer only in their
willingness-to-pay for a public good, and show that (i) there can be many diﬀerent equilibrium contribution groups, (ii) an equilibrium contribution group may not include the player
with the highest willingness-to-pay, and (iii) equilibrium contribution-group members may
not be consecutive in their willingness-to-pay.
Then, we analyze how equilibrium public goods provision is aﬀected as the economy
becomes larger. Following Milleron’s (1972) notion of replicating a public goods economy,3
we prove that the equilibrium public good provision level converges to zero as the economy
grows (Theorem 2).
This paper is organized as follows. The next two subsections briefly discuss some related
literature. In Section 2, we set out our public goods provision game, and introduce PCPNE
as an equilibrium concept. We also describe how a version of “Protection for Sale" model
by Grossman and Helpman can be treated in our game. In Section 3, we define an intuitive
hybrid solution concept, the FRP-core, and prove the equivalence between PCPNE and the
FRP-core (Theorem 1). In Section 4, we provide an example to reveal some interesting
properties of the FRP-core. In Section 5, we consider a replica economy and show that the
public goods provision level shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated in a certain way
(Theorem 2). Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides useful properties of the core of
convex games and an algorithm that finds a core allocation starting with an arbitrary utility
vector; Appendix B provides proofs of our results.

1.1

Related Literature on Public Goods Provision

It is well known that the public goods provision is subject to free-riding incentives. Although Samuelson’s (1954) view of this problem was pessimistic, Groves and Ledyard (1977)
show that eﬃcient public goods provision can be achieved in Nash equilibrium. Although
the Groves-Ledyard mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality, Hurwicz (1979) and
3

Muench (1972), Milleron (1972) and Conley (1994) discuss the diﬃculty of replicating a public goods
economy and oﬀer various possible methods. Milleron’s notion of replication is to split endowments with
replicates and adjust preferences so that agents’ concerns for the private good are relative to the size of their
endowments. This notion is employed by Healy (2007).

4
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Walker (1981) show that the Lindahl mechanism is implementable. Subsequently, numerous
mechanisms have been proposed to improve the properties of mechanisms. They all assume,
however, that players have no freedom to make participation decisions about the mechanism,
i.e., players’ participation to the mechanism is always assumed.
Introducing outside opportunities by a “reversion function” (each outcome is mapped to
another outcome in the case of no participation), Jackson and Palfrey (2001) analyze the
implementation problem including participation of all players when players’ participation to
a mechanism is voluntary. They extend the Maskin monotonicity condition to accommodate
voluntary participation problem. Although their reversion function is very general, it assigns
the same outcome no matter who deviates from the original outcome. Thus, the method may
not be suitable for a public goods provision problem in which diﬀerent players’ deviations
from participation may generate diﬀerent outcomes. Taking this consideration into account,
Healy (2007) analyzes the implementation problem in a public goods economy demanding
all players’ participation in equilibrium (equilibrium participation). He shows that as the
economy is replicated in Milleron’s sense (1972), the set of outcomes of any mechanism that
satisfies the equilibrium participation condition converges to the endowment. Although we
also show that the equilibrium public goods provision level converges to zero as the economy
is replicated, we allow some players not to participate in the contribution group in equilibrium
(and eﬃciency of public good provision within the lobby group is achieved, unlike in Healy,
2007). Thus, Healy’s and our results are quite diﬀerent from each other.
Closest to our work is the one by Saijo and Yamato (1999), who are the first to consider a
voluntary participation game with two stages in a public goods economy, without requiring
all players’ participation in equilibrium. They show a negative result on eﬃciency of public
goods provision, and then characterize subgame perfect equilibria in a symmetric CobbDouglas utility case. In contrast, we fully characterize the PCPNE of a menu auction
(common agency) game with a participation decision allowing heterogeneous players that
have quasi-linear utility functions.4
4

Shinohara (2003) derives the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium within the framework of Saijo and Yamato’s (1999) voluntary participation game with the Lindahl mechanism in the second stage. He considers a

5
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Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) show that in a binary public goods provision game where
symmetric players voluntarily make participation decisions, all pure strategy Nash equilibria
are eﬃcient (if contributions are not refundable in case of no provision). With asymmetric
players, there are many Nash equilibria with diﬀerent levels of cooperation. Maruta and
Okada (2005) refine those Nash equilibria by selecting the evolutionarily stable equilibria.
Shinohara (2007) examines a public goods provision problem with decreasing marginal benefits, and shows in the case of homogeneous players that it becomes harder to support eﬃcient
allocations as the eﬃcient level of the public good rises and hence the number of participants needed to provide the public good increases. Our Theorem 2 has some similarity to
this result.5
Le Breton and Salaniè (2003) analyze a common agency problem with asymmetric information on agents’ preferences. They show that equilibria can be ineﬃcient even in the
case where there is only one player in each interest group.6 If there are multiple players in
each interest group, failure to internalize the contribution benefits within the group reduces
contributions even more. Free-riding incentives under compulsory lobby participation exist
in the framework of Le Breton and Salaniè (2003), due to the failure of internalization. In
contrast, we analyze free-riding in a more obvious way by explicitly introducing participation
decisions.
case in which players are heterogeneous and shows that there can be multiple coalition-proof Nash equilibria
with diﬀerent sets of players participating in the mechanism. One of our results has the same message but
with a common agency game in the second stage (thus, payoﬀ allocation within lobby is flexible unlike in
Shinohara 2003).
5
Although the model and mechanism are very diﬀerent from ours, Nishimura and Shinohara (2007)
consider a multi-stage voluntary participation game in a discrete multi-unit public goods problem. They show
that Pareto-eﬃcient allocations are achieved in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium through a mechanism that
determines public goods provision unit-by-unit. Their eﬃciency result depends crucially on the assumption
that a player who did not participate in the mechanism in early stages can participate in the public good
provision later.
6
Laussel and Le Breton (1998) analyze the public good provision problem where each player must sign a
participation contract before knowing her own cost when all contribution schemes are proposed (then players’
costs are realized and the agent chooses an agenda). They show that all equilibria are eﬃcient, and there is
no free-riding incentive.

6
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1.2

Related Literature on International Trade

A seminar paper by Grossman and Helpman (1994) applies a menu auction (common agency)
game defined by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to an endogenous trade policy formation
problem, and analyzes the mechanism in which industries influence the government’s trade
policy through lobbying activities. In their model, principals (or players) are the lobbies that
represent industries while the agent is the government that values contributions provided by
lobbies as well as social welfare. Each lobby makes contributions in order to influence the
trade policy in its favor: it lobbies to raise the price for the good that it makes and to lower
the prices for other goods.7 One of their intriguing results is that in some case, lobbying
activities oﬀset each other so that the government chooses free trade while collecting a large
amount of contributions from all the industries that have conflicting interests.
Mitra (1999) extends the Grossman-Helpman model to endogenize lobby participation.
In his model, participation decision is made at the industry level, abstracting from freeriding incentive within the industry. He shows among others that Grossman and Helpman’s
(1994) aforementioned free-trade result still holds if the government cares about social welfare
strongly or if it cares about contributions heavily. In contrast, Bombardini (2007) and
Paltseva (2006) consider the cases in which firms in oligopolistic, import-competing industries
make participation decisions. Unlike Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Mitra (1999), firms
in the same industry have no conflict of interests over government policies as in the pure
public goods provision problem.
Bombardini (2007) constructs the model in which firms are diﬀerent in the amount of
their specific capital and empirically investigates how protection levels diﬀer across industries
depending on the distribution of firm sizes. She finds that industries with wide firm-size
dispersion obtain high levels of protection. Although her empirical result is very interesting,
she assumes that the most eﬃcient lobby group is formed. Namely, she assumes that firms
enter the lobby in the descending order of their capital: the firm with the largest capital enters
the lobby, then the firm with the second largest capital enters and so on, until the eﬃciency
7

This is because lobbies representing industries are ultimately consumers.
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benefit of adding a firm becomes smaller than the firm’s individual cost of lobby participation.
Indeed, we show by giving an example that it is not necessary that the equilibrium lobby
includes the most eﬃcient firm, nor is it necessary that the lobby members are consecutive
in their eﬃciencies.
Paltseva (2006) considers a lobby-participation game with symmetric firms to analyze
their free-riding incentives, and examines the symmetric Nash equilibrium outcomes of the
participants’ menu auction. Our paper is closest to Paltseva’s within the field of international
trade, but we allow asymmetric players and asymmetric contributions, and characterize all
PCPNEs. Due to transferable utilities, we need to employ a more sophisticated equilibrium
concept than Nash equilibrium in the participation stage if the symmetry assumption is
dropped. That is why we use PCPNE as our solution concept.

2

The Model

This section sets out the two-stage contribution game in which all players’ interests are in the
same direction, while the intensity of their interests can be heterogeneous. We first describe
the problem, then propose the FRP-core as a hybrid solution concept.

2.1

Public Goods Provision Problem

A stylized public goods model is defined as follows. There is a public good whose provision
level is denoted by a ∈ A = R+ .8 Provision cost function C : A → R+ is continuous and
strictly increasing with C(0) = 0. The government provides the public good, and its cost is
regarded as the government’s disutility from the provision. That is, the government’s utility
from providing a units of the public good is vG (a) = −C(a). Player i’s utility function is
quasi-linear such that the net consumption x of the private goods enter the function linearly,
i.e., vi (a) − x, where vi : A → R+ is a strictly increasing function with vi (0) = 0. In order to
guarantee the existence of a non-trivial solution, we assume that (i) there exists ã ∈ A such
8

For our equivalence result (Theorem 1), we only need comonotonic preferences over abstract agenda
set A. The extension is straightforward. We focus on the one-dimensional public goods economy just for
simplicity.

8
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that vi (ã) − C(ã) > 0 for all i ∈ N, where N is the set of players, and (ii) there is â ∈ A
P
such that i∈N vi (a) − C(a) < 0 for all a > â. The only new element to this standard public

goods provision game is that every player has a choice between participating in contributing
to the public goods provision and free-riding.

2.2

Voluntary Participation

We discuss the endogenous contribution-group formation and its consequences on the public
good provision. To this end, we do not only require the menu auction stage of public good
provision to be coalition-proof, but require the contribution-group formation itself to be
coalition-proof. To do so, we first need to define the first-stage group-formation game in an
appropriate manner, assuming that the outcome of each possible group S is a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium of a common agency game played by S. As an extension of CPNE in the
strategic form games to the one in the extensive form games, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston
(1987) define the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) as the coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium for multi-stage games.
The first-stage group-formation game is such that each player i ∈ N chooses her action
from the set Σ1i = {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 represent non-participation and participation,
respectively, i.e., player i announces her participation decision. Once action profile σ 1 =
(σ 11 , ..., σ 1n ) ∈ Σ1 = Πj∈N Σ1j is selected, then the contribution game takes place in the second
stage with the set of active players S(σ 1 ) = {i ∈ N : σ 1i = 1}.9
The second-stage game is a menu auction game (or a common agency game) played by
participating principals S(σ 1 ) (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). The set N \S(σ 1 ) is the set
of passive free-riders. Each player i ∈ S(σ 1 ) simultaneously oﬀers a contribution schedule
τ i : A → R+ . Given the profile of contribution schedules τ S(σ1 ) , the government G (the
9

In our model, there will be a single coalition lobbying for (or contributing to) the public goods provision.
In contrast, Ray and Vohra (2001) analyze a dynamic coalition bargaining of a public goods provision
problem with multiple resulting coalitions. For detailed surveys on coalition formation problems with multiple
coalitions (and externalities), see Bloch (1997) and Ray (2007). We do not allow multiple lobbying groups
to be faced with multiple agents (such as local governments), since the analysis would become exceedingly
complicated in such cases.

9
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agent) chooses a public goods provision level a ∈ A that maximizes its net payoﬀ:
uG (a, (τ i (a))i∈S(σ1 ) ) =

X

τ i (a) + vG (a)

i∈S(σ1 )

=

X

i∈S(σ1 )

τ i (a) − C(a),

where the first term on the right-hand side of the last equation is the total contribution and
the second term is the cost of public goods provision. If the government chooses a ∈ A, then
player i obtains her payoﬀ
ui (a, τ i (a)) = vi (a) − τ i (a),
for i ∈ S(σ 1 ), and
ui (a) = vi (a),
for i ∈
/ S(σ 1 ). The government’s optimal choice is described by
a∗ (S, τ S(σ1 ) ) ∈ arg max uG (a, (τ i (a))i∈S(σ1 ) ).
a∈A

In this game, the government is not a player; it is just an automaton that maximizes its payoﬀ
given the contribution schedules.10 Let T be the set of all contribution plans τ : A → R+ .
Player i’s second stage strategy σ 2i is a mapping σ 2i : 2N \{∅} → T : i.e., a contribution
/ S, then
schedule is assigned to each subgame. Note that in subgame S ∈ 2N \{∅}, if i ∈
σ 2i (S) : A → R+ is irrelevant to the outcome. The set of player i’s second-stage strategies is
denoted by Σ2i .
2.2.1

Example: Grossman-Helpman Model with a Single Industry

Here, we show how the above game can be accommodated to a single-industry version of
the “Protection for Sale” model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Suppose
that there is only one import competing industry with n firms in a small open country.
Firms with possibly diﬀerent levels of specific capital produce a homogenous commodity;
the government may provide a tariﬀ protection to the industry. The domestic price of the
10

Strictly speaking, since the government may have multiple optimal policies, we need to introduce a tiebreaking rule. However, it is easy to show that the set of truthful equilibria (see below) would not depend
on the choice of tie-breaking rules.
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commodity is p̃ = p + t, where p and t denote the world price and specific tariﬀ rate for
the commodity, respectively. Each firm i has a (reduced-form) profit function π i (p̃), or the
rent to its specific capital, which is strictly increasing in p̃. The government cares about
contributions from the firms as well as social welfare (total surplus). Social welfare W (p, t)
is defined by
W (p, t) = CS(p + t) +

X
i∈N

Ã

π i (p + t) + t D(p + t) −

X
i∈N

!

qi (p + t) ,

where CS(p̃) denotes a consumer surplus that is decreasing in p̃, and D(p̃) and qi (p̃) denote
consumer demands and firm i’s supply, respectively. The expression in the parentheses shows
the import level, and hence the last term represents the tariﬀ revenue. Social welfare can be
rewritten as
W (p, t) = W (p, 0) − L(p, t),
where L(p, t) denotes the deadweight loss as Figure 1 illustrates. Note that W (p, 0) is a
constant since the world price p is fixed for this small open economy. Thus, the government’s
payoﬀ function can be reduced further to vG (t) = −L(p, t) with the normalization W (p, 0) =
0. Similarly, firm i’s payoﬀ function can be written as vi (t) = π i (p + t) − πi (p) as p is a
constant.
Now we are ready to map the “protection for sale” model to our public goods provision
framework. Let S be the set of contribution-group participants in the set of firms N, and
others be free-riders. The contribution schedule for firm i ∈ S is τ i : T → R+ , where T = R
is the set of possible tariﬀ rates. Then the government’s payoﬀ function can be written as
uG (t, (τ i (t))i∈S ) =

X

τ i (t) + vG (t)

i∈S

=

X
i∈S

τ i (t) − L(p, t),

while firm i’s payoﬀ function is
ui (t, τ i (t)) = vi (t) − τ i (t)
= πi (p + t) − π i (p) − τ i (t),
11
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for i ∈ S, and
ui (t) = vi (t),
for i ∈
/ S. Thus, the “Protection for Sale” model with a single industry is described by our
public goods provision model with t = a, L(p, t) = C(a), and π i (p + t) − π i (p) = vi (a).
We endogenize firms’ lobby participation decision in our game. Paltseva (2007) considers
a symmetric-firm version of this extended “protection for sale” game with symmetric contribution schedules. Although Bombardini (2007) does not model firms’ participation decision
as a game, the rest is the same as the above lobbying game except that she assumes that
the lobby participation is costly.11

2.3

Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium in the ContributionGroup Participation Game

Now, we define PCPNE for our two-stage game, following Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston
(1987). Player i’s strategy σ i = (σ 1i , σ 2i ) ∈ Σi = Σ1i × Σ2i is such that σ 1i ∈ Σ1i denotes i’s
lobby participation choice, and σ 2i ∈ Σ2i is a function σ 2i : 2N \{∅} → T , where T is the set
of all functions τ : A → R+ .12 Each player’s payoﬀ function is ui : Σ → R, which is given in
the contribution game when contribution group S is determined by S(σ 1 ).
For T ⊆ N, we consider a reduced game Γ(T, σ −T ) in which only players in T are active
while players in N \ T are passive such that they always choose σ−T . We also consider
subgames for every σ 1 ∈ Σ1 , and reduced subgames Γ(T, σ 1 , σ 2−T ) in similar ways. A perfectly
2∗
∗
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) (σ ∗ , a∗ ) = ((σ 1∗
i , σ i )i∈N , a ) is defined recursively

as follows.13
1
(a) In a single-player, single-stage subgame Γ({i}, σ 1 , σ 2−{i} ), the strategy σ 2∗
i (S(σ )) ∈ T
11

Our Theorem 1 holds even in the existence of individual lobby participation costs.
For notational simplicity, we include outsiders’ second-stage strategies in the strategy profile. Of course,
such a non-participant’s second-stage strategies are absolutely irrelevant to the outcome since the government
does not receive contributions from them.
13
Note that in Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), the definition of PCPNE is based on strictly
improving coalitional deviations. However, we adopt a definition based on weakly improving coalitional
deviations, since the theorem on menu auction in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) uses CPNE based on
weakly improving deviation. For details on these two definitions, see Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999).
12
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and the agenda a∗ chosen by the agent is PCPNE if σ 2∗
i maximizes ui through the
choice of a∗ .
(b) Let (n, t) be the pair of the number of players and the number of stages of the reduced
(sub-) game, where t ∈ {1, 2}. Pick any pair of positive integers (m, r) ≤ (n, t) with
(m, r) 6= (n, t). For all T ⊆ N with |T | ≤ m, assume that PCPNE has been defined
for all reduced games Γ(T, σ −T ) and for their subgames Γ(T, σ 1 , σ 2−T ) (if r = 1, then
only for all reduced subgames Γ(T, σ 1 , σ 2−T )). Then,
(i) for all reduced games Γ(S, σ −S ) and for their subgames Γ(S, σ 1 , σ 2−S ) with |S| = n,
(σ ∗ , a∗ ) ∈ Σ × A is perfectly self-enforcing if for all T ⊂ S we have that (σ ∗T , a∗ ) is
PCPNE of the reduced game Γ(T, σ ∗S\T , σ −S ), and σ 2∗
T is PCPNE of the reduced
2
subgame Γ(T, σ 1 , σ 2∗
S\T , σ −S ),

and
(ii) for all S ⊆ N with |S| = n, (σ ∗S , a∗ ) is a PCPNE of the reduced game Γ(S, σ −S )
if (σ ∗S , a∗ ) is perfectly self-enforcing in reduced game Γ(S, σ −S ), and there is no
other perfectly self-enforcing σ 0S such that ui (σ 0S , σ −S ) ≥ ui (σ ∗S , σ −S ) for every
i ∈ S with at least one strict inequality.
For any T ⊆ N and any strategy profile σ, let P CP NE(Γ(T, σ −T )) denote the set of
PCPNE strategy profiles for T in the game Γ(T, σ −T ). For any strategy profile (σ, a), a strategic coalitional deviation (T, σ 0T , a0 ) from (σ, a) is credible if (σ 0T , a0 ) ∈ P CP NE(Γ(T, σ −T )).
A PCPNE is a strategy profile that is immune to any credible coalitional deviation. An
outcome allocation for (σ ∗ , a∗ ) is a list (S, a∗ , u, uG ) ∈ 2N × A × RN × R, where S = S(σ 1∗ )
and (u, uG ) is the resulting utility allocation for players.
There are two remarks to be made on PCPNE.
First, if a coalition T wants to deviate in the first stage within the reduced game Γ(T, σ −T )
(thus keeping the outsiders’ strategy profile fixed), it can orchestrate the whole plan of the

13
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deviation by assigning a new CPNE to each subgame so that the target allocation (by the
deviation) would be attained as PCPNE of the reduced game Γ(T, σ −T ).
Second, the definition of PCPNE coincides with the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
(CPNE) in the (static) second stage. Thus, a CPNE needs to be assigned to each subgame.
There are useful characterizations of CPNE of a menu auction (common agency) game in
the literature. Consider subgame S. Let us denote player i’s strategy in this subgame
σ 2i (S) : A → R+ by τ i : A → R+ . Bernheim and Whinston (1986) introduce a concept
of truthful strategies, where τ i is truthful relative to ā if and only if for all a ∈ A either
vi (a) − τ i (a) = vi (ā) − τ i (ā), or vi (a) − τ i (a) < vi (ā) − τ i (ā) with τ i (a) = 0. A truthful
Nash equilibrium (τ ∗S , a∗ ) is a Nash equilibrium such that τ ∗i is truthful relative to a∗ ∈ A
for all i ∈ S. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that (i) every truthful equilibrium is
a CPNE, and (ii) the set of truthful equilibria and that of CPNE in the utility space are
equivalent, and provide a nice characterization of CPNE in the utility space. Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) further analyze CPNE in utility space. One of many results in Laussel and
Le Breton (2001) provides a characterization of CPNE under a special (yet useful) property,
comonotonic payoﬀ property: ui (a) ≥ ui (a0 ) if and only if uj (a) ≥ uj (a0 ) for all i, j ∈ S and
all a, a0 ∈ A. Obviously, this property is satisfied in our public good provision problem.
Fact. (Laussel and Le Breton 2001) Consider a menu auction (common agency) problem
Γ = (S, A, (T , vi )i∈S , C) played by the set S of the principals and the agent G with a
comonotonic payoﬀ property. Then, in all CPNEs of the menu auction game, agent G obtains
uG = maxa∈A −C(a) (no rent property), and the set of CPNE in utility space is equivalent
to the core of the characteristic function game (Ṽ (T ))T ⊆S , where Ṽ (T ) = V (T ) − uG =
¢
¡P
v
(a)
−
C(a)
− uG .14
maxa∈A
i
i∈T
14

In the public goods provision problem, uG P
= −C(0) = 0, thus Ṽ P
(T ) = V (T ) for all T ⊆ S. A payoﬀ
vector uS = (ui )i∈S is in the core if and only if i∈S ui = V (S), and i∈T ui ≥ V (T ) for all T ⊂ S.
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3

The Main Result

Now, we characterize PCPNE. To do so, we first define an intuitive hybrid solution concept,
free-riding-proof core (FRP-core), which is the set of the Foley-core allocations that are
immune to free-riding incentives and are Pareto-optimal in a constrained sense.15 The FRPcore is always nonempty in the public good provision problem.
The public good provision problem determines two things: (i) which group provides
public goods and how much, and (ii) how to allocate the benefits from the public good
among the members of the group (or how to share the cost). For S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅, let
"
#
X
V (S) ≡ max
vi (a) − C(a) ,
a∈A

i∈S

and

a∗ (S) ≡ arg max
a∈A

An allocation for S is (S, a, u) such that u ∈

"
X
i∈S

RN
+,

#

vi (a) − C(a) .

P

i∈S

ui ≤

P

i∈S

vi (a)−C(a), and uj = vj (a)

for all j ∈
/ S (utility allocation). An eﬃcient allocation for S is an allocation (S, a, u) such
P
that i∈S ui = V (S) with a = a∗ (S). Note that N\S are passive free-riders, and they do not
contribute at all. Given that S is the contribution group, a natural way to allocate utility

among the members is to use the core (Foley 1970). A core allocation for S, (S, a∗ (S), u), is
P
an eﬃcient allocation for S such that i∈T ui ≥ V (T ) holds for all T ⊆ S.
However, a core allocation for S may not be immune to free-riding incentives by the mem-

bers of S. So we define a hybrid solution concept of cooperative and noncooperative games.
A FRP-core allocation for S (FRP-core allocation for S ) is a core allocation (S, a∗ (S), u)
for S such that
ui ≥ vi (a∗ (S\{i})) for any i ∈ S.
An FRP-core allocation for S is immune to unilateral deviations by the members of S. Note
that, given the nature of the public goods provision problem, we can allow a coalitional deviation from S at no cost (since one-person deviation is the most profitable). Let CoreF RP (S)
15

The Foley core of our public good economy is the standard core concept assuming that deviating coalitions have to provide public goods by themselves. That is, it assumes that there is no spillover of public
goods across the groups.
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be the set of all FRP-core allocations for S. For a large group S, CoreF RP (S) may be
empty, whereas for small groups it is nonempty (especially, for singleton groups it is always
nonempty). We collect FRP-core allocations for all S, and take their Pareto frontiers. The
set of FRP-core is defined as
CoreF RP
©
ª
= (S, a∗ (S), u) ∈ ∪S 0 ∈2N CoreF RP (S 0 ) : ∀T ∈ 2N , ∀u0 ∈ CoreF RP (T ), ∃i ∈ N with ui > u0i .
That is, an element of CoreF RP is a FRP-core allocation for some S that is not weakly
dominated by any other FRP-core allocation for any T . Note that CoreF RP , only achieving
constrained eﬃciency due to free-riding incentives, is not a subsolution of Core(N). Contrary
to the fact that CoreF RP (N) is often empty, there always exists a FRP-core allocation, since
CoreF RP (S) is nonempty for all singleton sets S = {i}.
Proposition 1. CoreF RP 6= ∅.
Now, we will characterize PCPNE by the FRP-core. In the public goods provision problem, the above Fact (Laussel and Le Breton 2001) implies that the second-stage CPNE
outcomes coincide with the set of all core allocations of a characteristic function form game
¢ 16
¡P
for S with (V (T ))T ⊆S where V (T ) = maxa∈A
This is nothing but
i∈T vi (a) − C(a) .

Foley’s core in a public goods economy for S (Foley, 1970). This observation gives us some

insight in our two-stage noncooperative game. First, for each subgame characterized by
S 0 = S(σ 10 ), the utility outcome uS 0 must be in the core of (V (T ))T ⊆S 0 . Second, given the
setup of our group-formation game in the first stage, if a CPNE outcome u in a subgame
S can be realized as the equilibrium outcome (on-equilibrium path), it is necessary that
u ∈ CoreF RP (S), since otherwise some member of S would deviate in the first stage obtaining a secured free-riding payoﬀ. This observation is useful in our analysis of the equivalence
theorem. With some constructions, we can show the following:
16

Indeed, CPNE and strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959) with weakly improving deviations are
equivalent in a menu auction (common agency) game with no-rent property. See Konishi, Le Breton, and
Weber (1999).
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Proposition 2. If an allocation (S, a∗ (S), u) is in the FRP-core, then there is a PCPNE σ
whose outcome is (S, a∗ (S), u).
We relegate the proof of Proposition 2 to the Appendix B (with some preliminary analyses
in the Appendix A). Here, we only describe how to construct PCPNE σ. First, in defining
σ, we need to assign a CPNE utility profile to every subgame that corresponds to a coalition
S ⊆ N. Since the second-stage strategy profile is described by utility allocations assigned to
each subgame, we partition the set of subgames S = {S ∈ 2N : S 6= ∅} into three categories:
(i) S1 = {S ∗ } on the equilibrium path, which is the contribution group formed in equilibrium,
(ii) S2 = {S ∈ S : S ∩ S ∗ = ∅}, and (iii) S3 = {S ∈ S\S1 : S ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅}. As Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S 0 corresponds to a core allocation for
S 0 . To support the equilibrium path (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP by a PCPNE, we need to
show that there is no credible deviation in the first stage. This requires careful assignments
of core allocations to all subgames.
We prove Proposition 2 by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that there is a
credible deviation T from S ∗ , which leads to the formation of lobby S 0 after the deviation. Then, for all members of T , both profitability of deviation and free-riding-proofness
must be satisfied. Thus, for every player i ∈ T , the post deviation payoﬀ u0i must satisfy
u0i ≥ ūi = max{u∗i , vi (S 0 \{i})}. The case where S 0 ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅ is most subtle. We show
that even in such cases, if there were such a deviation, there would exist an allocation
(S 0 , a∗ (S 0 ), u0 ) ∈ CoreF RP (S 0 ) that Pareto-dominates (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ). This contradicts the
assumption that (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP . We show Pareto-domination by using the fact
that the utility allocation assigned to subgame S 0 under σ is a core allocation, and construct
a core allocation by the algorithm that is provided in Appendix A.
Once this direction of the relationship between the FRP-core and PCPNE is established, the converse is trivial. The PCPNE requires free-riding-proofness. Thus, every
PCPNE must be a FRP-core allocation for some S. Since CoreF RP is the Pareto-frontier
of ∪S⊆N CoreF RP (S), Proposition 2 indeed implies that any Pareto-dominated FRP-core
allocation for S can be defeated by a FRP-core allocation.
17
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Theorem 1. An allocation (S, a∗ (S), u) is in the FRP-core if and only if there is a PCPNE
σ whose outcome is (S, a∗ (S), u).
Proof. We prove the converse of the relationship described in Proposition 2, i.e., we show
that every PCPNE σ generates a FRP-core allocation as its outcome. It is easy to see that the
outcome (S, a∗ (S), u) of a PCPNE σ is a FRP-core allocation (and not just core allocation)
for S, since otherwise a player would have an incentive to free-ride in the first stage of
the extension game and hence the resulting allocation will not be a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. Thus, (S, a∗ (S), u) ∈ CoreF RP (S). Now, suppose that u ∈
/ CoreF RP . Then,
there is a FRP-core allocation (S 0 , a∗ (S 0 ), u0 ) ∈ CoreF RP with u0 > u. Proposition 2 further
implies that a deviation by the grand coalition N can attain u0 with a PCPNE σ 0 . This
means that there is a credible coalitional deviation from σ, which leads to a contradiction.
Thus, every PCPNE achieves a FRP-core allocation. ¤
This result crucially depends on the “comonotonicity of preferences” (Laussel and Le
Breton, 2003), and perfectly nonexcludable public goods (free riders can fully enjoy public
goods). Without these assumptions, the above equivalence may not hold.
Although the FRP-core is much easier to grasp than PCPNE, it may still not be clear
how the FRP-core looks like. A simple example in the next section illustrates the properties
of FRP-core allocations and thus the outcome of PCPNE.

4

An Example: Linear Utility and Quadratic Cost

Let vi (a) = θi a for any i ∈ N and C(a) = a2 /2, where θi > 0 is a preference parameter.
Here in this section, we identify players by their preference parameters, i.e., θi = i for any
i ∈ N. Then, the optimal level of the public good for group S is determined by the first-order
P
condition i∈S θi − a = 0, i.e.,
X
θi .
a∗ (S) =
i∈S

18
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Consequently, the value of S is written as
Ã
!
!2
Ã
X
1 X
V (S) =
θi
θi −
θi
2
i∈S
i∈S
i∈S
¢2
¡P
i∈S θ i
.
=
2
X

For an outsider j ∈ N\S, the payoﬀ is

Ã
!
X
θi .
vj (a∗ (S)) = θj
i∈S

Consider the following example.
Example 1. Let N = {11, 5, 3, 1}, where θi = i for each i ∈ N.

First we check if the grand coalition S = N is supportable. When S = N, we have
P
a∗ (N) = i∈N i = 20, and V (N) = 202 /2 = 200. For the allocation to be free-riding-proof,

each player must obtain the following payoﬀ at the very least:

v11 (a∗ (N\{11})) = (20 − 11) × 11 = 99,
v5 (a∗ (N\{5})) = (20 − 5) × 5 = 75,
v3 (a∗ (N\{3})) = (20 − 3) × 3 = 51,
v1 (a∗ (N\{1})) = (20 − 1) × 1 = 19.
The sum of all these values exceeds the value of the grand coalition V (N). As a result, we
can conclude CoreF RP (N) = ∅.
• The FRP-core for the grand coalition N may be empty. Thus, the FRP-core may be
suboptimal.
Next, consider S = {11, 5}. Then, a∗ (S) = 16, and V (S) = 128. In order to check if the
FRP-core for S is nonempty, we first check again the free-riding incentives.
v(a∗ (S\{11})) = (16 − 11) × 11 = 55,
v(a∗ (S\{5})) = (16 − 5) × 5 = 55.
19
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Thus, if there is a FRP-core allocation for S, u = (u11 , u5 ) must satisfy
u11 + u5 = 128,
u11 ≥ 55,
u5 ≥ 55,
11 × 11
= 60.5,
u11 ≥
2
5×5
u5 ≥
= 12.5,
2
where the last two conditions are obtained by the core requirement. That is, we have17
Core({11, 5})
= {u ∈ R5+ : u11 + u5 = 128, u11 ≥ 60.5, u5 ≥ 12.5, u3 = 48, u2 = 32, u1 = 16},
and
CoreF RP ({11, 5})
= {u ∈ R5+ : u11 + u5 = 128, u11 ≥ 60.5, u5 ≥ 55, u3 = 48, u2 = 32, u1 = 16}.
It is readily seen that CoreF RP ({11, 5}) 6= ∅, but it is a smaller set than Core({11, 5}).
• Free-riding-proof constraints may narrow the set of attainable core allocations for a
coalition.
Note that in this case, only the free-riding incentive constraint for player 5 is binding. It is
better for player 11 to provide public goods alone than free-riding on player 5. ¤
Now, let us analyze the FRP-core. Since the FRP-core requires Pareto-eﬃciency on the
union of FRP-cores over all subsets S of the players, we first need to find the FRP-core for
each S. In general, even a minimal task of checking the nonemptiness of the FRP-core for S
is not easy, since the FRP-core for S demands two almost unrelated requirements: immunity
to coalitional deviation attempts and to free-riding incentives. However, it is easy to narrow
17

For notational simplicity, we abuse notations by dropping irrelevant arguments of allocations. Thus, in
this subsection, allocations are utility allocations.
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down the candidates by using a necessary condition for the nonemptiness of the FRP-core
for S.
Proposition 3. In the case of linear utility and quadratic cost, if the FRP-core for S is
nonempty, then S satisfies the following aggregate “no free-riding condition.”
Φ(S) ≡ V (S) −
=

X
i∈S

X

θi a∗ (S\{i})

i∈S

X
1
θi a∗ (S) − (a∗ (S))2 −
θi a∗ (S\{i}) ≥ 0,
2
i∈S

which is equivalent to
X
i∈S

θ2i

1
≥
2

!2
Ã
X
θi .
i∈S

The proof is straightforward and hence omitted. By utilizing this proposition, we can characterize the FRP-core of the public goods economy in Example 1.
Example 1. (continued) The FRP-core allocations are attained by groups {11, 5, 1},
{11, 3, 1}, {11, 5}, {11, 3}, and {5, 3}.
First, by applying Proposition 3, we find that there are 12 contribution groups that satisfy
the necessary condition for the nonempty FRP-core for S: {11, 5, 1}, {11, 3, 1}, {11, 5},
{11, 3}, {11, 1}, {5, 3}, {5, 1}, {3, 1}, {11}, {5}, {3}, and {1}.
The FRP-core for S = {11, 5, 3} is empty, for example. For S = {11, 5, 3}, we have
a∗ (S) = 19 and V (S) = 180.5. Since 11v(a∗ (S\{11})) = 88, 5v(a∗ (S\{5}) = 70, 3v(a∗ (S\{3})) =
48, and 88+70+48 > 180.5, the necessary condition for S = {11, 5, 3} to give a FRP-core allocation is violated. As we see, however, CoreF RP ({11, 5, 1}) is not empty. Thus {11, 5, 1} is
the group that achieves the highest level of public good while having a nonempty FRP-core.18
This analysis provides an interesting observation.
• (Even the largest) group that achieves a FRP-core allocation may not be consecutive.19
18

As shown below, group {11, 5, 1} supports some allocations in CoreF RP .
Although the context and approach are very diﬀerent, in political science and sociology, the formation
of such non-consecutive coalitions is of tremendous interest. For a game-theoretical treatment of this line of
literature (known and “Gamson’s law”), see Le Breton et al. (2007).
19
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The intuition behind this result is simple. Suppose Φ(S) is positive (say, S = {11, 5}).
Now, we try to find S 0 ⊃ S that still satisfies Φ(S 0 ) ≥ 0. If the value of Φ(S) is positive yet
not too large, then adding a player with high θ (say, player 3) may make Φ(S 0 ) < 0, since
adding such a player may greatly increase a∗ (S 0 ), making the free-riding problem severer.
On the contrary, adding a player with low θ (say, player 1) does not make the free-rider
problem too severe, so Φ(S 0 ) ≥ 0 may be satisfied relatively easily.
Among the above 12 groups, it is easy to see that groups {5, 1}, {3, 1}, {11}, {5}, {3},
and {1} do not survive the test of Pareto-domination. For example, consider S 0 = {11, 5}
and u0 = (73, 55, 48, 16) ∈ CoreF RP ({11, 5}). This is the best allocation for player 11 in
CoreF RP ({11, 5}) as the characterization of CoreF RP ({11, 5}) in the above indicates. Players
other than 11 and 5 are free-riders, and their payoﬀs are directly generated from a∗ ({11, 5}) =
16. Now it is straightforward to see that the allocation u0 dominates all allocations for the
above six groups; public good provision levels of those groups are insuﬃcient compared with
a∗ ({11, 5}) = 16.
On the contrary, {5, 3} is not dominated by any FRP-core allocations for any contribution
group. We can show that player 11 can obtain at most 73 in a FRP-core allocation for any
S 3 11, whereas she obtains 88 by free-riding on {5, 3}. Thus, player 11 would not join a
deviation. Without player 11’s cooperation, no free-riding core allocation that dominates
those of {5, 3} can be realized.
Similarly, FRP-core allocations for S = {11, 1} are dominated by the one for S 0 = {11, 5}.
Under S = {11, 1}, player 5 obtains 60, but S 0 can attain u0 = (63, 65, 48, 16). Free-ridingproof core allocations for {11, 3, 1} and {11, 3} cannot be beaten, however, by the ones for
S 0 = {11, 5}; player 5, for example, gets 70 even under {11, 3} while she would obtain at
most 67.5 under S 0 = {11, 5} as we can see from CoreF RP ({11, 5}) derived in the above.
Finally, consider S = {11, 5}, {11, 3}. The FRP-core allocations for S = {11, 5} are
characterized by u11 + u5 = 128, u11 ≥ 60.5 and u5 ≥ 55, with u3 = 48 and u1 = 16. Now,
consider S 0 = {11, 5, 1}, for which the FRP-core allocations are characterized by u011 + u05 +
u01 = 144.5, u011 + u05 ≥ 128, u011 ≥ 66, u05 ≥ 60, and u01 ≥ 16, with u03 = 51. (u05 + u01 ≥ 18
22
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and u011 + u01 ≥ 72 are satisfied because u011 ≥ 66, u05 ≥ 60, and u01 ≥ 16.) Here, S 0 can attain
u011 +u05 = 144.5−16 = 128.5 as long as u011 ≥ 66 and u05 ≥ 60. Thus, if u ∈ CoreF RP ({11, 5})
satisfies u11 +u5 = 128, 60.5 ≤ u11 ≤ 68.5, and 55 ≤ u5 ≤ 62.5, then u is improved upon by an
allocation in CoreF RP ({11, 5, 1}). However, if u ∈ CoreF RP ({11, 5}) satisfies u11 + u5 = 128,
u11 > 68.5, or u5 > 62.5, then u cannot be improved upon by group {11, 5, 1}. The FRPcore allocations for S = {11, 3} have a similar property with possible deviations by group
S 0 = {11, 3, 1}. This phenomenon illustrates another interesting observation:
• An expansion of a group definitely increases the total value of the group, while it gives
less flexibility in allocating the benefits among the group members since free-riding
incentives increase as the level of the public good provision rises. As a result, some
unequal FRP-core allocations for the original group may not be improved upon by the
group expansion.
In summary, the FRP-core is the union of the following sets of allocations attained by
the five diﬀerent groups.
1. S = {11, 5, 1}; a∗ (S) = 17 and all FRP-core allocations for S are included:
CoreF RP ({11, 5, 1})
= {u ∈ R5+ : u11 + u5 + u1 = 144.5, u3 = 51, u11 ≥ 66, u5 ≥ 60, u1 ≥ 16.}
2. S = {11, 3, 1}; a∗ (S) = 15 and all FRP-core allocations for S are included:
CoreF RP ({11, 3, 1})
= {u ∈ R5+ : u11 + u3 + u1 = 112.5, u5 = 75, u11 ≥ 60.5, u3 ≥ 36, u1 ≥ 14}.
3. S = {11, 5}; a∗ (S) = 16 and only a subset of FRP-core allocations for S is included:
ª
©
u ∈ CoreF RP ({11, 5}) : u11 > 68.5 or u5 > 62.5

= {u ∈ R5+ : u11 + u5 = 128, u3 = 48, ũ1 = 16, 68.5 < u11 ≤ 73or 62.5 < u5 ≤ 67.5}
23
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4. S = {11, 3}; a∗ (S) = 14 and only a subset of FRP-core allocations for S is included:
ª
©
u ∈ CoreF RP ({11, 3}) : u11 > 62.5

= {u ∈ R5+ : u11 + u3 = 98, u5 = 70, u1 = 14, 62.5 < u11 ≤ 65}

5. S = {5, 3}; a∗ (S) = 8 and all FRP-core allocations for S are included:
CoreF RP ({5, 3})
= {u ∈ R5+ : u5 + u3 = 32, u11 = 88, ũ1 = 8, u5 ≥ 15, u3 ≥ 15}
¤
Before closing this section, let us compare the FRP-core allocations with a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move voluntary public goods provision game studied by Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian (1986). Each player i chooses her monetary contribution mi ≥ 0 to finance
p P
a public good. The public good provision level is given by a(m) = 2 i∈N mi reflecting

the cost function of public goods production C(a) = a2 /2. Consider player i. Given that
p
others contribute M−i in total, player i chooses mi so as to maximize θi 2 (mi + M−i ) − mi .
©
ª
The best response for player i is m∗i = max (θ2i /2) − M−i , 0 . It is easy to see that in our

example, only player 11 contributes, so the public goods provision level is 11. Thus, by
forming a contribution group in the first stage, it is possible to increase the equilibrium level
of the public good provision. But it is also possible that the level of public good provision is
lower than the Nash equilibrium provision level of the standard voluntary contribution game,
as we have found that group {5, 3} achieves some FRP-core allocations in our example.
• There may be FRP-core allocations that achieve lower public goods provision levels
than the Nash equilibrium outcome of a simple voluntary contribution game studied by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986).
This occurs because in our setup, player 11 can commit to being an outsider in the first
stage, which cannot happen in a simultaneous-move voluntary contribution game. Finally,
needless to say, we have:
24
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• The FRP-core may be a highly nonconvex set as diﬀerent allocations may be realized
by diﬀerent contribution groups.

5

Replicated Economies

In this section, we analyze whether or not public goods provision and the participation rate
decrease as an economy is replicated. There is a tricky issue in replicating a (pure) public
goods economy. If the set of consumers is simply replicated, the amount of resources in the
economy grows to infinity, while maintaining the same cost function for public good production. Following Milleron’s (1972) method, Healy (2007) makes each consumer’s endowment
shrink proportionally to the population as the economy is replicated to overcome this problem; consumers’ preferences are also modified in the replication process.20 We adopt the
same preference modification in the replication of a quasi-linear economy. We shrink each
consumer’s willingness-to-pay function (and thus utility function) proportionally as the economy is replicated. This way of replication is natural for a quasi-linear economy, since the
aggregate willingness-to-pay and cost functions stay the same in the replication process.
The original economy is a list E = (N, (vi )i∈N , C). Let r = 1, 2, 3, ... be a natural number.
The rth replica of E is a list E r = (N r , (virq )i∈N,q=1,...,r , C), where N r = ∪i∈N {i1 , ..., ir } and
virq (a) = vir (a) = 1r vi (a) for all q = 1, .., r.21 Let a characteristic function form game generated
from E r be V r .
Each PCPNE of a contribution-group participation game generated from E r has a corresponding FRP-core allocation (S, a∗ (S), u∗ ) of the characteristic function form game V r .
Note that for any r, and for any S ⊆ N r , the public good provision level a = a∗ (S)
is determined so that the sum of willingness-to-pay across all members of S equal the
P
marginal cost of public good provision, i.e., iq ∈S vir0q (a) = C 0 (a). Furthermore, we need
20

Conley (1994) uses a diﬀerent definition of replicated economy, and investigates the convergence of the
core.
21
Let x and a denote the consumption level of a private good and the level of a public good, and let ºi
and ºri be preference relations in the original and rth replica economy, respectively. According to Milleron’s
(1972) preference modification, relation ºri is generated such that (x, a) ºri (x0 , a0 ) if (rx, a) ºi (rx0 , a0 ). In
the quasi-linear economy where ºi is described by the utility function x + vi (a), this implies vir (a) = vi (a)/r.
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´
³
r
∗
r
∗
(a
(S))
−
v
(a
(S\{i
})
≥ C(a∗ (S)) in order to satisfy the free-riding-proofness,
v
q
iq
iq
iq ∈S

P

where the terms in the parentheses on the left-hand side indicate how much each player can
pay without sacrificing the free-riding-proofness. Let mi (S) ∈ {0, · · · , r} denote the number
of type i players in S. Then, the above necessary condition for free-riding-proofness can be
rewritten as

X
i∈N

mi (S) (vir (a∗ (S)) − vir (a∗ (S\{iq }))) ≥ C(a∗ (S)),

where it should be understood that S \{iq } denote the set of all players but one type i player
in S. Or equivalently,
X mi (S)
i∈N

r

[vi (a∗ (S)) − vi (a∗ (S\{iq }))] ≥ C(a∗ (S)).

(1)

Now, consider the kth replication, where k = 1, 2, · · · , of this rth replica of the original
economy, which implies that each player in the rth replica of the original economy is divided
into k players. Let S k be a coalition in this k × rth replica economy that contains all k
replica players of all members of S in rth replica economy. Obviously, a∗ (S) in rth replica
economy equals a∗ (S k ) in k × rth replica economy. However, although the coeﬃcients satisfy
mi (S)/r = mi (S k )/(kr), a∗ (S k \{i}) converges to a∗ (S k ) = a∗ (S) as k goes to infinity. Thus,
the k × rth replica economy’s counterpart of inequality (1) would be violated at some point.
Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that C and vi are twice continuously diﬀerentiable for any i ∈ N
with (i) C(0) = 0, C 0 (a) > 0, C 00 (a) > 0, and lima→0 C 0 (a) = 0, and (ii) vi0 (a) > 0 and
vi00 (a) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N. Then, for any ā > 0, there exists a natural number r̄(ā) such that
for any r ≥ r̄(a), a∗ (S ∗ ) < ā holds for any (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP (V r ) .
The proof is given in the Appendix B. Together with Theorem 1, Proposition 4 immediately
implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that C and vi are twice continuously diﬀerentiable for any i ∈ N with
(i) C(0) = 0, C 0 (a) > 0, C 00 (a) > 0, and lima→0 C 0 (a) = 0, and (ii) vi0 (a) > 0 and vi00 (a) ≤ 0
26
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for all i ∈ N. Then, the PCPNE public good provision levels shrink to zero as the economy
is replicated.
Although this result has some similarity to the main result of Healy (2007), the models and the objectives are very diﬀerent; unlike our model, Healy requires that all players
(voluntarily) participate in equilibrium. Note also that unlike Theorem 1, Theorem 2 (and
Proposition 4) relies on concavity and convexity of utility and cost functions, respectively,
as well as diﬀerentiability of them.

6

Summary

This paper has added players’ participation decisions to common agency games. The solution concept we use is the perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE), which is a
natural extension of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium to a dynamic game. We have considered a special class of common agency games: an environment without conflict of interests
(comonotonic preferences), e.g., public goods economies. We have shown that PCPNE is
equivalent to the FRP-core, which is the Pareto-frontier of a union of all core allocations
for the subset of players that are immune to unilateral free-riding incentives; the FRP-core
serves as an intuitive hybrid solution in transferable utility case. With a simple example, we
have found that the equilibrium contribution group may not be consecutive (with respect to
the willingness-to-pay), and the public good may be underprovided than in voluntary contribution game in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). Furthermore, public good provision
relative to the size of economy goes down to zero, as the participants of the economy are
replicated to large numbers.

Appendix A: Preliminary Analysis on the Core of Convex Games
In this appendix, we list a few useful preliminary results on the core of convex games. In
our public goods domain, the characteristic-function game generated from a (public goods)
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economy is convex. Let V : 2N → R with V (∅) = 0 be a characteristic-function form game.
Game V is convex if V (S ∪ T ) + V (S ∩ T ) ≥ V (S) + V (T ) for all pairs of subsets S and T of
P
P
N. The core of game V is Core(N, V ) = {u ∈ RN : i∈N ui = V (N) and i∈S ui ≥ V (S)

for all S ⊂ N }. Shapley (1971) analyzes the properties of the core of convex games in detail.
One of his results useful for us is the following.

Property 1. (Shapley, 1971) Let ω : {1, · · · , |N|} → N be an arbitrary bijection, and
let uω(1) = V ({ω(1)}), uω(2) = V ({ω(1), ω(2)}) − V ({ω(1)}),..., and uω(|N|) = V (N) −
V (N\{ω(|N|)}). Then, u = (ui )i∈N ∈ Core(N, V ), and the set of all such allocations forms
the set of vertices of Core(N, V ).
Now, we consider a reduced game, in which outsiders always join coalitions and walk away
with the payoﬀs they could obtain by forming their own coalition. Let T be a proper subset
of N. A reduced game of V on T is ṼT : 2T → R such that ṼT (S) = V (S ∪(N\T ))−V (N\T )
for all S ⊆ T . We have the following result.
Property 2. Suppose that V : N → R is a convex game. Let uN\T = (ui )i∈N\T be a core
allocation of a game V : N\T → R. Then, uT ∈ Core(T, ṼT ) if and only if (uT , uN\T ) ∈
Core(N, V ).
Proof. First, we show that uT ∈ Core(T, ṼT ) if (uT , uN\T ) ∈ Core(N, V ). Since (uT , uN\T ) ∈
P
Core(N, V ),
i∈S∪(N\T ) ui ≥ V (S ∪ (N\T )) holds for all S ⊂ T . Rewriting this, we
P
P
have i∈S ui ≥ V (S ∪ (N\T )) − i∈N \T ui = V (S ∪ (N \T )) − V (N\T ) = ṼT (S). Thus,

uT ∈ Core(T, Ṽ ).

Second, we show that uT ∈ Core(T, ṼT ) implies (uT , uN\T ) ∈ Core(N, V ). Suppose this
is not the case. Then, there is S ⊂ N such that
V (S) >

X
i∈S

ui =

X

i∈S∩T

ui +

X

ui .

(2)

i∈S∩(N\T )

Since uT ∈ Core(T, Ṽ ) and V is a convex game, we have

P

i∈S∩T

ui ≥ V (S ∪ (N\T )) −

V (N\T ) ≥ V (S) − V (S ∩ (N\T )). Substituting this inequality into (2), we have V (S) >
28
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P
V (S)−V (S∩(N\T ))+ i∈S∩(N\T ) ui , which leads to a contradiction since uN \T ∈ Core(N\T, V )
P
implies i∈S∩(N\T ) ui ≥ V (S ∩ (N\T )). ¤
Now, we rewrite the core. Let u = (ui )i∈N be an arbitrary utility vector. Let
Q+ (u) = {S ∈ 2N :
Q0 (u) = {S ∈ 2N :
−

N

Q (u) = {S ∈ 2 :

X

uj > V (S)},

j∈S

X

uj = V (S)},

j∈S

X

uj < V (S)}.

j∈S

That is, sets Q+ (u) and Q− (u) denote the collections of coalitions in which players as a whole
are satisfied and unsatisfied (in the strict sense) with the utility vector u, respectively. The set
Q0 (u) is the collection of coalitions in which players are just indiﬀerent collectively between
deviating and not deviating. Obviously, a utility vector u is in the core, i.e., u ∈ Core(N, V ),
if and only if Q− (u) = ∅ (or S ∈ Q+ (u) ∪ Q0 (u) for all S ∈ 2N ) and N ∈ Q0 (u). Let
P
η(S, u) ≡ [V (S) − i∈S ui ]/ |S| be the (per capita) shortage of payoﬀ for coalition S for any

S ∈ Q− (u). Let

−
0
0
−
Q−
max (u) ≡ {S ∈ Q (u) : η(S, u) ≥ η(S , u) for all S ∈ Q (u)},

and
Q−
S.
max (u) = ∪S∈Q−
max (u)
Using the above definitions, we now construct an algorithm that starts from an arbitrary
utility vector u and terminates with a core allocation û.
Algorithm. Let u ∈ RN and let V : N → R be a convex game. Let u(t) be the utility
vector at stage t ∈ R+ , and u(0) = u (the initial value).
(a) Suppose Q− (u) = ∅. Then, 2N \{∅} = Q0 (u) ∪ Q+ (u). If N ∈ Q0 (u(0)), then the
P
algorithm terminates immediately. Otherwise, i∈N ui > V (N) holds, and we reduce
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each ui for i ∈ N\(∪S∈Q0 (u) S) continuously at a common speed as t increases.22 Since
all elements in Q0 (u) continue to be in Q0 (u(t)), while some of elements of Q+ (u(t))
switch to Q0 (u(t)) in the process, Q0 (u(t)) monotonically expands as t increases. Thus,
N ∈ Q0 (u(t̂)) occurs at some stage t̂. Then we terminate the process. The final
outcome is û = u(t̂).
(b) Suppose Q− (u) 6= ∅. There are two phases, starting with Phase 1.
i. Phase 1: Start with u(0) = u. For all i ∈ Q−
max (u(t)), increase ui continuously at
a common speed. Terminate this phase of the algorithm when Q−
max (u(t)) = ∅ (or
Q− (u(t)) = ∅), and call such t as t̃.23
ii. Phase 2: Now, Q− (u(t̃)) = ∅. Then, we go to the procedure in (a), and we reach
a final outcome û = u(t̂) when N ∈ Q0 (u(t̂)) occurs. ¤

Let Q0 (u) ≡ ∪S∈Q0 (u) S, and define
W ≡ {i ∈ N : ∃t ≥ 0 with i ∈ Q−
max (u(t)) in phase 1 of case (b)},
I ≡ {i ∈ N : i ∈ Q0 (u(0)) in case (a), or i ∈ Q0 (u(t̃))\W in case (b)},
/ Q0 (u(t̃)) in case (b)}.
L ≡ {i ∈ N : i ∈
/ Q0 (u(0)) in case (a), or i ∈
These sets will be shown to be collections of players who gain, remain indiﬀerent, and lose
in the above algorithm relative to the initial value u, respectively. By the construction of
the algorithm, the following Lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1. Set N is partitioned into W , I, and L: ûi > ui for all i ∈ W , ûi = ui for all
i ∈ I, and ûi < ui for all i ∈ L.
22

It follows from the definition of a convex game that ∪Q∈Q0 (u) Q = N implies N ∈ Q0 (u). To prove this
claim, it suﬃces to show that if T, T 0 ∈ Q0 (u), then T ∪ T 0 ∈ Q0 (u) when Q− (u) = P
∅ as is assumed.
P We have
0
0
0
from the definition of a convex game
that
V
(T
∪T
)+V
(T
∩T
)
≥
V
(T
)+V
(T
)
=
0 ui +
i∈T
∪T
i∈T ∩T 0 ui .
P
Since T ∩ T 0 P
∈ Q0 (u) ∪ Q+ (u), i∈T ∩T 0 ui ≥ V (T ∩ T 0 ). Together with the above inequality, this implies
V (T ∪ T 0 ) ≥ i∈T ∪T 0 ui . Since Q− (u) = ∅, T ∪ T 0 ∈ Q0 (u).
23
This process guarantees that every player i ∈ Q−
max (u(t)) at some stage t ∈ [0, t̃] must belong to some
0
S ∈ Q0 (u(t̃)) at the end of phase 1.
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Proof. Note that the payoﬀ for any player in W does not change in phase 2 of case (b) as
W ⊆ ∪S∈Q0 (u(t̃)) S. Thus, for all i ∈ W , ûi > ui . Given this, the rest is obvious. ¤
This lemma says that the winners, unaﬀected players, and losers of the algorithm are identified by sets W , I, and L, respectively.
Lemma 2. Consider the above algorithm. In phase 1 of case (b), Q−
max (u(t)) monotonically
expands as t increases for t ∈ [0, t̃). This phase terminates with Q− (u(t̃)) = ∅. Moreover,
0
0
W = limt→t̃ Q−
max (u(t)) ∈ Q (u(t̃)), and W ∈ Q (u(t̂)).

Proof. As t increases, the payoﬀs of all members of Q−
max (u(t)) increase at the same speed;
thus for any S ∈ Q−
max (u(t)), η(S, u(t)) decreases at the same speed. Note that for all other
−
coalitions T ∈
/ Q−
max (u(t)), η(T, u(t)) decreases at a slower pace (if T ∩ Qmax (u(t)) 6= ∅) or
−
stays constant (if T ∩ Q−
max (u(t)) = ∅). Therefore, Qmax (u(t)) monotonically expands as t

increases. This monotonic utility-raising process continues until Q− (u(t)) = ∅ realizes at
−
t = t̃. Since Q−
max (u(t)) monotonically expands, W = limt→t̃ Qmax (u(t)) holds.
0
Now, we will show Q−
S ∈ Q−
max (u) = ∪S∈Q−
max (u), which proves W ∈ Q (u(t̃))
max (u)

and W ∈ Q0 (u(t̂)) (in phase 2 of case (b), payoﬀs of players in W are not aﬀected). Let
S1 , S2 ∈ Q−
max (u) with S1 6= S2 . Let

P
P
V (S2 ) − i∈S2 ui
V (S1 ) − i∈S1 ui
=
.
η̄ ≡
|S1 |
|S2 |

By convexity, it follows that
V (S1 ∪ S2 ) + V (S1 ∩ S2 ) ≥ V (S1 ) + V (S2 )
= η̄ (|S1 | + |S2 |) +
Since

X

ui +

i∈S1

X

ui .

i∈S2

P
V (S1 ∩ S2 ) − i∈S1 ∩S2 ui
≤ η̄,
|S1 ∩ S2 |

we have

V (S1 ∪ S2 ) ≥ η̄ (|S1 | + |S2 |) +

X

i∈S1

ui +

X

i∈S2

≥ η̄ (|S1 | + |S2 | − |S1 ∩ S2 |) +

ui − V (S1 ∩ S2 )

X

i∈S1

ui +

X

i∈S2

ui −

X

ui ,

i∈S1 ∩S2

31
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper185

32

KONISHI and Furusawa: Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Fo

or

P
V (S1 ∪ S2 ) − i∈S1 ∪S2 ui
≥ η̄.
|S1 ∪ S2 |

−
Thus, S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Q−
max (u). Repeated application of the same argument proves Qmax (u) ∈

Q−
max (u). ¤

Lemma 3. Starting from any initial value u ∈ RN , this algorithm terminates with a core
allocation û ∈ Core(N, V ).

Proof. First, we show that case (a) terminates with a core allocation. To this end, we
P
need only show that ∪S∈Q0 (u) S 6= N whenever i∈N ui > V (N) (otherwise, the algorithm
P
terminates with an infeasible u). Suppose to the contrary that i∈N ui > V (N), while
∪S∈Q0 (u) S = N in case (a). Let S1 , S2 , ..., SK ∈ Q0 (u) be distinct subsets of N with ∪K
k=1 Sk =
P
P
N. Then, we have i∈S1 ui = V (S1 ) and i∈S2 ui = V (S2 ). By convexity, V (S1 ∪ S2 ) +
P
P
V (S1 ∩ S2 ) ≥ V (S1 ) + V (S2 ) = i∈S1 ui + i∈S2 ui holds. By the construction of the
P
algorithm, S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Q0 (u) or S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Q+ (u), i.e., V (S1 ∩ S2 ) ≤ i∈S1 ∩S2 ui holds. Thus,
P
we have V (S1 ∪ S2 ) ≥ i∈S1 ∪S2 ui . Applying the same argument to S1 ∪ S2 and S3 , we
P
have V (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ) ≥ i∈S1 ∪S2 ∪S3 ui , since (S1 ∪ S2 ) ∩ S3 ⊂ S3 implies (S1 ∪ S2 ) ∩ S3 ∈

Q0 (u) or (S1 ∪ S2 ) ∩ S3 ∈ Q+ (u). Repeated application of the same argument generates
P
P
u
=
V (N) = V (∪K
K
i
k=1 Sk ) ≥
i∈∪
Sk
i∈N ui . This is a contradiction. Thus, in case
k=1

(a), the algorithm terminates with a feasible allocation. Since u(t) changes continuously,

N ∈ Q0 (û) holds, and û ∈ Core(N, V ).
Now, it follows from Lemma 2 that phase 1 of case (b) terminates with Q− (ũ) = ∅. Thus,
the same argument as in case (a) applies to phase 2 of case (b), leading to the conclusion
that û ∈ Core(N, V ) also in case (b). ¤
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, we construct a strategy profile σ, which will be shown to support (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ),
where u∗ ∈ CoreF RP (S ∗ ), as a PCPNE. In defining σ, we assign a CPNE utility profile to
every subgame S 0 . Then, we show by way of contradiction that there is no credible and
profitable deviation from σ.
A strategy profile in the second stage σ 2 is generated from utility allocations assigned in
each subgame (we utilize truthful strategies that support utility outcomes). We partition the
set of subgames S = {S 0 ∈ 2N : S 0 6= ∅} into three categories: S1 = {S ∗ } on the equilibrium
path, S2 = {S 0 ∈ S : S 0 ∩ S ∗ = ∅}, and S3 = {S 0 ∈ S\S1 : S 0 ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅}. As Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) show, a CPNE outcome in a subgame S 0 corresponds to a core allocation for
S 0 . In order to support the equilibrium path (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ), we need to show that there is
no credible deviation in the first stage. Since a credible deviation requires both free-ridingproofness and profitability, utility level ūi = max{u∗i , vi (S 0 \{i})} plays an important role as
to whether or not player i joins a coalitional deviation.
We construct a core allocation for subgame S 0 with the algorithm described in the Appendix A, starting with the initial value ū. Then we show that if there exists a credible deviation by coalition T , which induces (S 0 , a∗ (S 0 ), u0 ) from (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ), then (S \
S ∗ , a∗ (S \ S ∗ ), (u0i )i∈S 0 \S ∗ , (vj (a∗ (S 0 \ S ∗ )))j6∈S 0 \S ∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP (S 0 \ S ∗ ) and Pareto-dominates
(S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ). This is a contradiction to the presumption that (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP .
Thus, we will conclude that there is no credible deviation from (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ).
The construction of the core allocation for each subgame is as follows.
1. We assign (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP to the on-equilibrium subgame S ∗ .
2. For any S 0 with S 0 ∩ S ∗ = ∅, we assign an extreme point of the core for S 0 of a
convex game. For an arbitrarily selected order ω over S 0 , we assign payoﬀ vector
uω(1) = V ({ω(1)}) − V (∅), uω(2) = V ({ω(1), ω(2)}) − V ({ω(1)}), and so on, following
Shapley (1971). Call this allocation ûS 0 ∈ Core(S 0 , V ) (see Property 1 in the Appendix
33
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A).
3. For any S 0 with S 0 ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅, we assign a core allocation in the following manner. It requires a few steps. First, we deal with the outsiders S 0 \ S ∗ . Let ω :
{1, · · · , |S 0 \S ∗ |} → S 0 \S ∗ be an arbitrary bijection, and let ûω(1) = V ({ω(1)}), ûω(2) =
V ({ω(1), ω(2)}) − V ({ω(1)}), · · · , ûω(|S 0 \S ∗ |) = V (S 0 \S ∗ ) − V ((S 0 \S ∗ )\{ω(|S 0 \S ∗ |)}).
Such a core allocation minimizes the total payoﬀs for S 0 \S ∗ (Shapley, 1971). The
rest V (S 0 ) − V (S 0 \S ∗ ) goes to S 0 ∩ S ∗ .

Consider a reduced game of (S 0 , V ) on
0

∗

S 0 ∩ S ∗ with uS 0 \S ∗ as given above and ṼS 0 ∩S ∗ : 2S ∩S → R such that ṼS 0 ∩S ∗ (Q) =
P
V (Q ∪ (S 0 \S ∗ )) − j∈S 0 \S ∗ uj = V (Q ∪ (S 0 \S ∗ )) − V (S 0 \S ∗ ). By Property 2, we know
that uS 0 ∩S ∗ ∈ Core(S 0 ∩ S ∗ , ṼS 0 ∩S ∗ ) if and only if (uS 0 ∩S ∗ , uS 0 \S ∗ ) ∈ Core(S 0 , V ). For
each i ∈ S 0 ∩ S ∗ , let ūi = max{u∗i , vi (S 0 \{i})}. By the algorithm in Appendix A, we
construct a core allocation ûS 0 ∩S ∗ from vector ūS 0 ∩S ∗ = (ūi )i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ for the reduced game
0

ṼS 0 ∩S ∗ of game V : 2S → R.
We support these core allocations by truthful strategies. Let σ 1i = 1 for i ∈ S ∗ , and σ 1i = 0
for i ∈
/ S ∗ . Let σ 2i [S ∗ ] be a truthful strategy relative to a∗ (S ∗ ) such that σ 2i [S ∗ ](a∗ (S ∗ )) =
vi (a∗ (S ∗ )) − u∗i for all i ∈ S ∗ , and let σ 2i [S 0 ] be a truthful strategy relative to a∗ (S 0 ) with
σ 2i [S 0 ](a∗ (S 0 )) = vi (a∗ (S 0 )) − ûi (S 0 ) for all i ∈ S 0 . Since a core allocation with truthful
strategies is assigned to every subgame, it is a CPNE. If there is a deviation from σ, therefore,
it must happen in the first stage.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists a coalition T that profitably and credibly
deviates from the equilibrium σ. Note that in the reduced game played by T , it must be a
PCPNE deviation with σ 0T for given σ −T . In the original equilibrium, S ∗ is the contribution
group. This implies that every i ∈ (N\S ∗ )\T plays σ 1i = 0, i.e., free-riding, in the first stage,
while every i ∈ S ∗ \T plays σ 1i = 1 in the first stage and engages in the same strategy, i.e.,
the prescribed menu σ 2i (S 0 ) contingent to group S 0 , in the second stage. Any i ∈ T \S ∗ has
∗
chosen σ 1i = 0 but chooses σ 10
i = 1 upon deviation in the first stage. Whereas i ∈ T ∩ S may

or may not choose σ 10
i = 1. Some may choose to free-ride by switching to 0, while others
stay in the contribution group, adjusting their strategies in the second stage. To summarize,
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let S 0 be the contribution group formed as a result of T ’s deviation, i.e., S 0 = S(σ 1−T , σ 10
T ).
Then, there are five groups of players to be considered (see Figure 2).
(i) the members of S ∗ \S 0 ⊂ T that switch to free-riding after the deviation,
(ii) the members of S 0 \S ∗ ⊂ T that join the contribution group upon deviation,
(iii) the members of (S ∗ ∩ S 0 )\T ⊂ S 0 that still participate in the contribution group after
the deviation, with the same prescribed menu in the second stage,
(iv) the members of (S ∗ ∩ S 0 ) ∩ T ⊂ S 0 that change their strategies in the second stage,
(v) the members of N \(S 0 ∪ S ∗ ) that are outsiders both before and after the deviation.
Let the resulting allocation be (S 0 , a∗ (S 0 ), u0 ). Since the deviation is profitable and credible, the members of T , i.e., those who are categorized in (i), (ii), and (iv) are better oﬀ after
the deviation. That is,
vi (a∗ (S 0 )) ≥ u∗i for all i ∈ S ∗ \S 0 ,
u0i ≥ ūi for all i ∈ S 0 \S ∗ ,
u0i ≥ ūi for all i ∈ (S ∗ ∩ S 0 ) ∩ T ,
where ūi = max{u∗i , vi (a∗ (S 0 \{i})}.
Given our supposition, the following claims must be true.
First we claim that members of (ii) exist and that a∗ (S 0 ) > a∗ (S ∗ ) as they are better oﬀ
after the deviation. The set of players in (ii) is nonempty, since otherwise S 0 ⊂ S ∗ and a
coalitional deviation by T cannot be profitable as (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) is a core allocation.
Claim 1. S 0 \S ∗ 6= ∅ and a∗ (S 0 ) > a∗ (S ∗ ).
Since all players use truthful strategies in the strategy profile σ even after T ’s deviation,
the members in (iii) (outsiders of T ) obtain the same payoﬀ vector û(S ∗ ∩S 0 )\T (S 0 ) as in the
original subgame CPNE for S 0 . It is because in subgame S 0 (even after deviation), a∗ (S 0 )
must be provided as a CPNE (core) must be assigned to the subgame. Thus, we have the
following for group (iii).
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Claim 2. After the deviation by T , every i ∈ (S ∗ ∩ S 0 )\T ⊂ S 0 receives exactly u0i = ûi .
Since u0 needs to be a CPNE payoﬀ vector in the second stage of the reduced game by
P
T , we have i∈S 0 \S ∗ u0i ≥ V (S 0 \S ∗ ) for uS 0 to be in Core(S 0 , V ). By the construction of ûS 0 ,
P
on the other hand, we have i∈S 0 \S ∗ ûi = V (S 0 \S ∗ ). Thus, we have the following for group

(ii).

Claim 3.

P

i∈S 0 \S ∗

u0i ≥ V (S 0 \S ∗ ) =

P

i∈S 0 \S ∗

ûi .

The next claim shows that the counterpart of Claim 3 holds for group (iv).
Claim 4.

P

i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T

u0i =

P

i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T

ûi

Proof of Claim 4. Group (iv) consists of members of W , I, and L. Note that u0i ≥ ūi for
any i ∈ S 0 ∩ S ∗ ∩ T since otherwise they would have no incentive to join the deviation.
First consider the set W of winners in group (iv); we have ûi ≥ ūi by the definition of
W . The contribution group S 0 must be immune to a coalitional deviation by W , so we have
X

i∈W

u0i ≥ Ṽ (W ) =

X

ûi ,

i∈W

where the equality holds by Lemma 2. As for players in I, we have ûi = ūi by definition.
Thus, it follows from u0i ≥ ūi that u0i ≥ ûi for any i ∈ I. Payoﬀs for losers, by definition,
must satisfy ûi < ūi , so we have u0i > ûi because u0i ≥ ūi . However, it follows from Claim 2,
P
P
Claim 3, and i∈S 0 u0i = i∈S 0 ûi = V (S 0 ) that
X

i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T

u0i ≤

X

ûi .

(3)

i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T

P
P
P
P
Together with i∈W u0i ≥ i∈W ûi and i∈I u0i ≥ i∈I ûi , these implies that L is empty, and
P
P
P
hence i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T u0i ≥ i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T ûi . Consequently, we have from (3) that i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T u0i =
P
i∈S 0 ∩S ∗ ∩T ûi . ¤
Claims 2, 3, and 4 immediately imply the following for group (ii).
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Claim 5.

P

i∈S 0 \S ∗

u0i =

P

i∈S 0 \S ∗

ûi = V (S 0 \S ∗ )

The final claim follows from Claim 5 and the supposition that the deviation by T is
profitable and credible.
Claim 6. Consider a deviation by S 0 ∪ S ∗ such that S 0 \ S ∗ is the resulting contribution group (all members in S ∗ stop contributing). Then the allocation (S 0 \ S ∗ , a∗ (S 0 \
F RP
(S 0 \S ∗ ) and Pareto-dominates (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ).
S ∗ ), (u0i )i∈S 0 \S ∗ , (vj (a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ )))j ∈S
/ 0 \S ∗ ) is in Core

Proof of Claim 6. Since the deviation by T is profitable, we have
X

i∈S 0 \S ∗

vi (a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ )) − C(a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ )) = V (S 0 \S ∗ )
=

X

u0i

i∈S 0 \S ∗

>
Thus, we have

P

i∈S 0 \S ∗

vi (a∗ (S 0 \ S ∗ )) >

X

vi (a∗ (S ∗ )).

i∈S 0 \S ∗

P

i∈S 0 \S ∗

vi (a∗ (S ∗ )), and hence a∗ (S 0 \ S ∗ ) > a∗ (S ∗ ).

Now, since the deviation by T is credible, and hence u0i ≥ vi (a∗ (S 0 \ {i})) ≥ vi (a∗ ((S 0 \ S ∗ ) \
{i})) for any i ∈ S 0 \ S ∗ , Claim 5 implies that (S 0 \ S ∗ , a∗ (S 0 \ S ∗ ), (u0i )i∈S 0 \S ∗ , (vj (a∗ (S 0 \
F RP
(S 0 \ S ∗ ).
S ∗ )))j ∈S
/ 0 \S ∗ ) ∈ Core
∗
Next, we show that ((u0i )i∈S 0 \S ∗ , (vj (a∗ (S 0 \ S ∗ )))j ∈S
/ 0 \S ∗ ) Pareto-dominates u . First, the

profitability of the deviation by T immediately implies that u0i ≥ vi (a∗ (S ∗ )) = u∗i for any
i ∈ S 0 \ S ∗ . Thus, we have shown the Pareto-domination for group (ii). Pareto-domination
for group (v) is immediate from a∗ (S 0 \ S ∗ ) > a∗ (S ∗ ). As for groups (i), (iii), and (iv), i.e.,
for all i ∈ S ∗ , we first note that since u∗ ∈ Core(S ∗ ) and the game V is convex, we have
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u∗i ≤ V (S ∗ ) − V (S ∗ \{i}) (Shapley 1971). Now,
V (S ∗ ) − V (S ∗ \{i})
=

X

j∈S ∗

⎛

vj (a∗ (S ∗ )) − C(a∗ (S ∗ )) − ⎝

∗

j∈S ∗ \{i}

∗

< vi (a (S ))
+

X

j∈S ∗ \{i}

X

⎛

vj (a∗ (S ∗ )) − C(a∗ (S ∗ )) − ⎝

⎞

vj (a∗ (S ∗ \{i})) − C(a∗ (S ∗ \{i}))⎠
X

j∈S ∗ \{i}

< vi (a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ )),

where the last inequality holds since

P

j∈S ∗ \{i}

⎞

vj (a∗ (S ∗ \{i})) − C(a∗ (S ∗ \{i}))⎠

vj (a) − C(a) is maximized at a = a∗ (S ∗ \{i}).

This proves that all members of groups (i), (iii), and (iv) are better oﬀ in the allocation
∗ ∗
∗
∗
(S 0 \S ∗ , a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ ), (u0i )i∈S 0 \S ∗ , (vj (a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ )))j ∈S
/ 0 \S ∗ ). Hence, we conclude that (S , a (S ), u ) ∈

CoreF RP is Pareto-dominated by (S 0 \S ∗ , a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ ), (u0i )i∈S 0 \S ∗ , (vj (a∗ (S 0 \S ∗ )))j ∈S
/ 0 \S ∗ ), which

is in CoreF RP (S 0 \S ∗ ). ¤

The statement of Claim 6 is an apparent contradiction to (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP .
Thus, we have shown that there is no profitable and credible deviation from the constructed
strategy profile σ, so σ is a PCPNE.

Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose to the contrary that for all natural number n, there exists r ≥ n such that
(Sr , a∗ (Sr ), u∗r ) ∈ CoreF RP (V r ) and a∗ (Sr ) ≥ ā. This implies that there exists an increasing
sequence of natural numbers r that satisfy (Sr , a∗ (Sr ), u∗r ) ∈ CoreF RP (V r ). We show that
(under this supposition) for any r with (Sr , a∗ (Sr ), u∗r ) ∈ CoreF RP (V r ) and any iq ∈ Sr ,
a∗ (Sr \ {iq }) approaches a∗ (Sr ) as r → ∞, and hence the left-hand side of
X mi (S)
i∈N

r

[vi (a∗ (S)) − vi (a∗ (S\{iq }))] ≥ C(a∗ (S)).

(1)

diminishes to zero (since vi0 (a∗ (S)) ≤ vi0 (ā) < ∞). Since C(a∗ (S)) ≥ C(ā) > 0, this implies that (1) is violated eventually as r → ∞, which in turn leads to a contradiction to
(Sr , a∗ (Sr ), u∗r ) ∈ CoreF RP (V r ).
38
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Now, a∗ (Sr ), the public good provision level induced by the contribution group Sr , is
chosen so as to satisfy the first-order condition:
X mj (Sr )
j∈N

where [mj (Sr )/r]vj0 (a) =

P

iq ∈S

r

vj0 (a∗ (Sr )) − C 0 (a∗ (Sr )) = 0,

(4)

vir0q (a). For any r, the left-hand side of (4) is continuous and

strictly decreasing in the public good provision level a since vj00 ≤ 0 and C 00 > 0 (as Figure 3
illustrates). Similarly, for any iq ∈ Sr , the optimality of public good provision requires that
a∗ (Sr \ {iq }) satisfy
X mj (Sr \ {iq })
r

j∈N

vj0 (a∗ (Sr \ {iq })) − C 0 (a∗ (Sr \ {iq })) = 0,

(5)

or equivalently
X mj (Sr )
r

j∈N

vj0 (a∗ (Sr \ {iq })) −

vi0 (a∗ (Sr \ {iq }))
− C 0 (a∗ (Sr \ {iq })) = 0,
r

where the second term in the second equation represents the free-rider iq ’s marginal benefit
from the public good provision.
Now, we claim that for any ∈ (0, ā), there exists a positive integer r such that for any
r≥r,

X mj (Sr )
j∈N

r

vj0 (a∗ (Sr ) − ) −

vi0 (a∗ (Sr ) − )
− C 0 (a∗ (Sr ) − ) > 0,
r

i.e., the left-hand side of (5), evaluated at a = a∗ (Sr ) − instead of a∗ (Sr \ {iq }), is positive
as Figure 3 shows. Together with vj00 ≤ 0 and C 00 > 0, this implies that a∗ (Sr \ {iq }) ∈
(a∗ (Sr ) − , a∗ (Sr )), which in turn implies the convergence of a∗ (Sr \ {iq }) to a∗ (Sr ).
To show the claim, we first define the minimum C 00 over the relevant range as c ≡
mina∈[0,a∗ (N)] C 00 (a). It follows from C 00 > 0 that c > 0. Now, for any r, it follows from (4)
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and Taylor’s formula that there exists a0 ∈ [a∗ (Sr ) − , a∗ (Sr )] such that
X mj (Sr )
vj0 (a∗ (Sr ) − ) − C 0 (a∗ (Sr ) − )
r
j∈N
=

X mj (Sr )
j∈N

−
=

"

r

vj0 (a∗ (Sr )) − C 0 (a∗ (Sr ))

"
X mj (Sr )
j∈N

r

C 00 (a0 ) −

≥ c,

vj00 (a0 )

j∈N

0

#

− C (a )

X mj (Sr )
r

00

#

vj00 (a0 )

where we have used vj00 ≤ 0 to derive the last inequality. On the other hand, it follows from
vi0 (a∗ (Sr ) − ) ≤ vi0 (ā − ) (as a∗ (Sr ) > ā) that there exists r such that
vi0 (a∗ (Sr ) − )
v0 (ā − )
c
≤ i
<
r
r
2

holds for any r ≥ r . Then the claim follows immediately since
X mj (Sr )
v 0 (a∗ (Sr ) − )
c
vj0 (a∗ (Sr ) − ) − i
− C 0 (a∗ (Sr ) − ) > c −
r
r
2
j∈N
> 0.

Now, we have from mi (Sr ) ≤ r and the claim established above that
X mi (Sr )
[vi (a∗ (Sr )) − vi (a∗ (Sr \ {iq }))]
r
i∈N
X
≤
[vi (a∗ (Sr )) − vi (a∗ (Sr \ {iq }))] → 0 as r → ∞.
i∈N

∗

Since C(a (S)) > C(ā) > 0, we have shown that there exists r̄(ā) such that for any r ≥ r̄(ā),
the free-riding-proofness condition (1) fails to be satisfied, which implies that a∗ (S ∗ ) < ā for
any (S ∗ , a∗ (S ∗ ), u∗ ) ∈ CoreF RP (V r ) when r ≥ r̄(ā).
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Figure 1. The “Protection for Sale” model with a single industry
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Figure 2. A Deviation from S *
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∑
j∈N

m j (S r )
r

v n ' (a) − C ' (a)

a* (Sr )

a

a

a * (S r ) − ε
a * (S r \ {iq })

∑
j∈N

m j ( S r \ {i })
r

v n ' (a) − C ' (a)

Figure 3. Convergence of a * ( S r \ {iq }) to a * ( S r )
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